












































(artificial moral agent) (Allen, Varner, & Zinser, 2000; Floridi & Sand-
ers, 2004; Fossa, 2018; Grodzinsky, Miller, & Wolf, 2008; Himma, 













得‧史特勞森 (Peter F. Strawson) (1974) 著名的論文〈自由與怨恨〉 
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靈測試 (Turing Test) 來回應。1 艾倫‧圖靈 (Alan Turing) 為了判
定機器是否能思考，提議如下的測試：如果機器能夠在人類不知情
的情況下進行對話，且不被發現是機器，那這台機器就可以被判定
                                               
1 我感謝審查人提出這個問題。 

























(Floridi & Sanders, 2004; Fossa, 2018; Grodzinsky et al., 2008; 































































































































(Strawson, 1974) 來說明人類限定理由。 
                                               
4 嚴格說起來，應當是適用於所有作為道德主體的人類上，因為有些人類 (暫時) 不
是道德主體，那人類限定理由就不適用於這些人。 








































































































                                               
5 關於參與者反應態度的這兩個面向，可以參考 Watson (2014)。  
6 嚴格說來，即便不是人類，但若是具有人格性的道德主體，即擁有情感、意志、行
為能力的存在者，應可參與在人際關係中。那人類限定理由也可以適用在這些存在
者。為了簡化，本文只限制在討論人類與 (不具人格性的) 機器人上。 


















































































































































電影《機械公敵》(I, Robot) 的一段情節來說明這點。 
《機械公敵》描述在未來的世界中，自動化機器人已經廣泛使













































































































反思機器人的道德擬人主義  203 
參考文獻 
Allen, C., Varner, G., & Zinser, J. (2000). Prolegomena to any future 
artificial moral agent. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Arti-
ficial Intelligence, 12, 3: 251-261. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
09528130050111428 
Brożek, B., & Janik, B. (2019). Can artificial intelligences be moral 
agents? New Ideas in Psychology, 54: 101-106. https://doi.org/ 
10.1016/j.newideapsych.2018.12.002 
Floridi, L., & Sanders, J. W. (2004). On the morality of artificial agents. 
Minds and Machines, 14, 3: 349-379. https://doi.org/10.1023/ 
B:MIND.0000035461.63578.9d 
Fossa, F. (2018). Artificial moral agents: Moral mentors or sensible 
tools? Ethics and Information Technology, 20, 2: 115-126. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9451-y 
Grodzinsky, F. S., Miller, K. W., & Wolf, M. J. (2008). The ethics of 
designing artificial agents. Ethics and Information Technology, 10, 
2-3: 115-121. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9163-9 
Gunkel, D. J. (2012). The machine question: Critical perspectives on AI, 
robots, and ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Himma, K. E. (2009). Artificial agency, consciousness, and the criteria 
for moral agency: What properties must an artificial agent have to 
be a moral agent? Ethics and Information Technology, 11, 1: 19-
29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9167-5 
IMDb. (2004). Quotes. Retrieved from https://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0343818/quotes/qt0474786 
Laukyte, M. (2017). Artificial agents among us: Should we recognize 
them as agents proper? Ethics and Information Technology, 19, 1: 
1-17. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-016-9411-3 
Snowdon, P., & Gomes, A. (2019). Peter Frederick Strawson. Retrieved 
from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/strawson/ 
Strawson, P. F. (1974). Freedom and resentment and other essays. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
Torrance, S. (2012). Artificial agents and the expanding ethical circle. 
204 歐美研究 
AI & Society, 28, 4: 399-414. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146- 
012-0422-2 
van Wynsberghe, A., & Robbins, S. (2019). Critiquing the reasons for 
making artificial moral agents. Science and Engineering Ethics, 25: 
719-735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8 
Wallach, W., & Allen, C. (2008). Moral machines: Teaching robots right 
from wrong. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Watson, G. (2014). Peter Strawson on responsibility and sociality. In D. 
Shoemaker & N. Tognazzini (Eds.), Oxford studies in agency and 
responsibility (Vol. 2, pp. 15-32). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.  
Weber, K. (2013). What is it like to encounter an autonomous artificial 




反思機器人的道德擬人主義  205 









If robots are to function automatically, without human supervision, 
as depicted in sci-fi imagination, then we must ensure that robots not 
commit moral wrongs. According to the behaviourist conception of 
moral agency, if robots, assessed purely on the basis of behaviour, per-
form as morally as humans, they can be considered moral agents. This 
naturally leads to moral anthropomorphism: the position that whatever 
moral standards apply to humans apply equally to robots. I argue 
against moral anthropomorphism. In light of P. F. Strawson’s insights 
into interpersonal relationships and reactive attitudes, and drawing on 
paternalist actions as examples, I argue that robots, being not persons, 
are unable to participate in interpersonal relationships, and therefore 
their paternalist actions towards humans ought to be less permissible 
than humans’. 
 
Key Words: robots, artificial intelligence (AI), moral agency, moral 
anthropomorphism, reactive attitudes 
 
 
